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provincial public policy on assisted human reproduction.Abstract The matter of ‘abandoned embryos’ arises when surplus IVF embryos are frozen and stored for later use. If the fertility
clinic or storage facility in question does not have clear direction about what to do with these embryos, and/or payment for storage
ceases, and/or the embryo providers cannot be reached, the embryos raise an ethical and practical challenge. On the one hand, there
is a commitment to respect the autonomy of embryo providers to determine what should happen to their frozen embryos. On the
other hand, there are weighty reasons why fertility clinics and storage facilities do not want responsibility, potentially in perpetuity,
for other people’s frozen embryos. This article examines the matter of ‘abandoned embryos’ – the emergence of the term, its use in
policy and law, and its implications in the Canadian case. We demonstrate that despite an intricate legislative framework, there are
important gaps that leave fertility clinics and storage facilities in the tenuous position of discarding ‘abandoned embryos’ without
clear authorization, or storing them indefinitely. We argue that clarity in consent procedures coupled with flexible time limits on
embryo storage provide an approach that can best serve the interests of all involved.
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On 30 November 2012, the British Columbia Women’s Centre
for Reproductive Health ceased operations. At the time, the
Centre had frozen human sperm and embryos in storage for
more than 1200 people. While preparing to close its doors6.04.002
ublished by Elsevier Ltd. This
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).and afterwards, staff at the Centre tried to contact all
persons with sperm and embryos in storage to ascertain their
wishes regarding transfer to another fertility clinic or
discard. The staff made hundreds of telephone calls, sent
letters by registered mail, issued second mailings to
alternate addresses for letters that were returned to sender,is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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petitioned the British Columbia Supreme Court for an order
permitting the sperm and embryos in storage to be
discarded. A Court order was granted validating the Centre’s
authority to discard the frozen sperm and embryos (Lam v
University of British Columbia 2013 BCSC 2142). With this
decision in hand, the staff made a final effort to reach those
with sperm or embryos in storage in order to be able to act
on their wishes, and then discarded what materials
remained.
The uncertainty experienced by the British Columbia
Women’s Centre for Reproductive Health about what to do
with the sperm and embryos stored in their fertility clinic
was unique because of the circumstances precipitating
decision-making – namely, closure of the clinic. In important
respects, however, this uncertainty is commonly experi-
enced by fertility clinics and storage facilities in jurisdictions
without legislated time limits, as they struggle to under-
stand the scope of their obligations regarding what have
been described as ‘orphaned embryos’ or more commonly
‘abandoned embryos’. These are embryos placed in storage
by people who are now ‘lost to follow-up’ – people who have
completed or dropped out of fertility treatment, stopped
paying storage fees, and are not able to be contacted by the
clinic or storage facility to confirm or provide wishes
regarding the future use or discard of frozen embryos no
longer wanted for ‘own’ reproductive use.
In the literature, a range of terms is used to describe
various options for using or discarding embryos. For
example, the term ‘disposition’ is often used to refer to
options that include both using embryos and discarding
them. ‘Transfer’ often refers to making use of embryos for
one’s own reproductive purposes, or the reproductive
purposes of others, but can also refer to donation to
research. Embryos being discarded are often described in
terms of ‘destruction’ or ‘disposal.’ For clarity, we differ-
entiate between ways of ‘using’ embryos (which include own
reproductive use, third-party reproductive use, improving
assisted reproduction procedures, providing instruction in
assisted reproduction procedures, and research) and
‘discarding’ embryos when no such use is to occur before
the embryos are destroyed.
This article proceeds in four parts. First, we provide a
history of how the term ‘abandoned embryos’ came into
common parlance and identify its contemporary scope,
focusing on the Canadian case. Although the term rarely
appears in official public policy or law, it continues to be
used by professional medical associations (ASRM, 2013;
O’Neill and Blackmer, 2015), in popular media (Blackwell,
2013; Kirkey, 2013) and by clinicians (Elford et al., 2004) in
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
elsewhere. Second, we trace the introduction of the current
regulatory framework in Canada governing embryo use. We
show how this framework anticipates the need for clear
directives for the future use of embryos in storage, but does
not include any provisions for discarding unused embryos.
Third, we briefly review Canadian case law relevant to the
question of how ‘abandoned embryos’ should be handled.
Finally, we conclude that legally valid written instructions in
consent forms regarding the use or discard of frozen embryos
should be respected (i.e. acted upon), and that those
instructions should be constrained by clear legislated timelimits on embryo storage. In jurisdictions that do not have a
legislated limit on embryo storage, this approach can best
serve the interests of all concerned parties – persons with
embryos in storage, fertility clinics and storage facilities.The emergence of ‘abandoned embryos’
Fertility clinics around the world have untold numbers of
human embryos in storage. Typically, this is because more
embryos are created in a stimulated IVF cycle than can
safely be transferred, and the embryos that are not
transferred are often frozen for possible future use
(Goswami et al., 2015; Karpin et al., 2013). Ideally, when
embryos are frozen for later use, clear written instructions
regarding future ‘own use’, ‘use by others’, and possibly
eventual discard are obtained from the person(s) for whom
the embryos were created (who may or may not be the
providers of the sperm or eggs, as when donor gametes are
used to create the embryos in question). In some instances,
however, there are embryos in storage for a good length of
time – placed there by people who are now ‘lost to
follow-up’ – for which clear written instructions about
using or discarding their embryos are either missing or
incomplete. These embryos pose an ethical and practical
problem for fertility clinics and storage facilities (Baylis,
2015; Blackwell, 2013; Kirkey, 2013). On the one hand, there
is the commitment to respect autonomy and recognition of
the responsibilities (if not rights) of individuals and couples
to determine what should happen to their frozen embryos.
On the other hand, there are practical and weighty reasons
why fertility clinics and storage facilities do not want legal
and financial responsibility, potentially in perpetuity, for
other people’s frozen embryos.
It appears that the term ‘abandoned embryos’ was first
used in 1983, not long after the first use of frozen embryos to
achieve a live birth. In 1981, an American couple, Elsa and
Mario Rios, were treated at Queen Victoria Medical Centre in
Melbourne, Australia. A number of IVF embryos were created
using anonymous sperm. Several of the embryos were
transferred in the hope of establishing a pregnancy and
two were frozen for later reproductive use. The initial
transfer did not result in a pregnancy and, before the couple
could use the frozen embryos in a second attempt, Elsa and
Mario died in a plane crash. In the aftermath, a number of
media reports discussed the fate of these embryos, specu-
lating as to whether any children born of them might be
entitled to their estate. One widely published Associated
Press article quoted Margaret Tighe, then-president of an
Australian anti-abortion group, as stating that ‘it is terrible
that human beings are allowed to be produced in laborato-
ries, frozen, and then abandoned and allowed to die’
(Kentucky New Era, 1984; New York Times, 1984). This
appears to be the first use of ‘abandoned’ to describe
embryos, thereby seeking to anthropomorphize embryos in
storage in order to argue that their discard would be
tantamount to abortion and, in the same line of argument,
tantamount to killing a living being. Use of the term
‘abandoned’ (like ‘orphaned’) also served to equate embry-
os to children in a way that vilifies those who do not use the
embryos they create to initiate a pregnancy. Indeed, the
terms ‘abandoned embryos’ and ‘orphaned embryos’
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example Ferriman, 2011; Mundy, 2006). Shortly after this
first, problematic use of the term ‘abandoned embryos’, the
language of abandonment appeared in policy documents
(Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1985) and the academic
literature (Dickens, 1987; Robertson, 1985/1986).
The term ‘abandoned embryos’ was cemented in popular
discourse in 1996, on the five-year anniversary of the UK’s
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. This Act, originally
passed in 1991, established a 5-year maximum storage period
for frozen embryos. As the initial 5-year deadline (31 July 1996)
approached, fertility clinics in the UK began contacting their
patients for consent to discard their frozen embryos. The
responses to these efforts were uneven and ‘in some clinics,
more than half of the patients failed to respond’ (Edwards and
Beard, 1997). Media accounts described those who failed to
respond as abandoning their embryos like ‘lost property at a
railway station’ (Nacheman, 1996).
With fervent discussion about the ethics of discarding
embryos in the UK looming large, the USmedia initiated debate
about what should happen in the US, where there were no laws
limiting embryo storage (Ibrahim, 1996; Schreuder, 1996). In
1997, the Ethics Committee of the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) published a Committee Opinion
on the Disposition of Abandoned Embryos affirming that:
[I]t is ethical for a program to consider embryos abandoned if
more than five years have passed since contact with a couple,
diligent efforts have been made by telephone and registered
mail to contact the couple at their last known address, and no
written instruction from the couple exists concerning disposition
(1997 p. 1S).
With this Opinion, the ASRM recognized the phenomenon
of abandoned embryos as a widespread and pervasive
problem. The ASRM Opinion was reviewed and endorsed in
2004 during the US presidential election amidst debate over
the ethics of embryonic stem cell research, catapulting the
term into popular usage (Gold, 2004; Kinsley, 2004). In 2013,
nearly 20 years after the ASRM Opinion was first developed,
it was revised to expand the scope of the term ‘abandoned
embryos’:
Another form of abandonment would be when an individual or
couple with dispositional control over stored embryos may
simply affirmatively indicate to the program or facility that they
do not wish to have anything further to do with the embryos,
thereby effectively delegating dispositional control to the
program or facility (2013, p.1848).
With this addition, abandoned embryos in the US were
redefined by the ASRM to include intentional as well as
unintentional abandonment. The term ‘abandoned embryos’
then, has been used to describe embryos: (i) in storage for
an extended period of time; (ii) where there are no clear
written instructions from the gamete and embryo providers
about what to do with these embryos if they are not to be
thawed for the reproductive use of the individuals or couples
for whom they were created; and (iii), for any number of
reasons, these individuals or couples cannot be contacted to
provide clear written instructions; or (iv) where they are
wilfully ‘abandoned.’Whereas the absence of written instructions is a defining
feature of most ‘abandoned embryos’ according to the
ASRM, this is not necessarily so in Canada, where there are
usually written instructions in consent forms documenting
the wishes of the gamete and embryo providers. The
challenge for Canadian fertility clinics and storage facilities
is that the written instructions – created in accordance with
the Assisted Human Reproduction Act (AHR Act) (Canada
2004) and its regulations on consent (Canada 2007) – may
not provide adequate guidance regarding the use or discard
of frozen embryos. For example, the instructions may only
address anticipated ‘own use’, and may not include
instructions for use by others or instructions for eventual
discard (when ‘own use’ and ‘use by others’ is not an
option). A second problem in Canada is that when there are
consent forms with clear written instructions about use and
discard, fertility clinics and storage facilities are unwilling
(or very reluctant) to act on these instructions when the
embryo providers cannot be contacted to affirm or withdraw
their original consent (Ravitsky and Dupras-Leduc, 2015,
p.229). This appears to be the case even when clinic policies
clearly indicate that frozen embryos will be discarded in the
event of default on payment or loss of contact.
Indeed, it appears that fertility clinics and storage
facilities in Canada perceive consent forms providing
direction on the future use or discard of stored embryos as
just that – consent forms, which are always revocable, not
contracts. Due to the passage of time between when consent
forms were originally signed, and when the clinic or storage
facility would like to act on the prior written instructions to
use or to discard embryos, there are important concerns
about the possibility that people will have changed their
minds (Newton et al., 2007). Most clinics and storage
facilities want to obtain a contemporaneous consent in no
small part to avoid a situation whereby individuals or couples
return for their embryos and, finding them gone, object to
any and all actions taken to use or discard their embryos. As
such, in Canada, the use of the term ‘abandoned embryos’ is
more expansive than in the US insofar as the term also
captures embryos: (i) in storage for an extended period of
time; (ii) where there are clear written instructions about
the future use or discard of these embryos, but these
instructions cannot be reaffirmed by the embryo providers;
and (iii), for any number of reasons, these individuals or
couples cannot be contacted.
However, use of the term ‘abandoned embryos’ to
describe embryos for which clear written instructions are
either missing or available but not acted upon is both
inappropriate and inaccurate. First, the term ‘abandoned
embryos’ is inappropriate, as it suggests that responsibility
for missing instructions regarding the use or discard of frozen
embryos is the fault of the gamete or embryo providers.
Abandonment differs from loss, for example, insofar as
abandonment involves intent, a wilfulness in leaving behind
an item or person. The fact is that embryos may end up
labelled as abandoned through no fault or intention of
individuals or couples, as when clinics fail to get proper
written instructions in their consent forms, or fail to ensure
that written instructions are complete. The same is true in
situations where fertility clinics or storage facilities
misplace or lose the relevant consent documents. In such
cases, the embryos are not abandoned. Second, the term
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embryos in storage have made plans to use or discard their
embryos in the future, and fertility clinics or storage
facilities are loath to act on their instructions.
Governing so-called abandoned embryos
in Canada
In Canada, concern with so-called abandoned embryos
emerged with early attempts to study assisted reproductive
technologies. A 1985 Ontario Law Reform Commission
report, Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters,
suggested that in cases where embryos were seemingly
abandoned, fertility clinics or storage facilities might be in a
position to decide whether to donate the embryos to
research. To this end, the Ontario Law Reform Commission
asserted that ‘the issue of voluntary transfer or abandon-
ment’ of both gametes and embryos were cause for concern,
and that the use of advance directives might not be
sufficient to account for the range of issues that might
arise (1985, p.201–202).
Use of the word ‘abandoned’ to describe embryos in
Canada was made more explicitly in 1989, when media
coverage of new embryo freezing programmes discussed
what might eventually happen to embryos in storage.
Articles published in Canada at this time referenced the
Rios case, identifying fertility clinics’ initial attempts
to address concerns about using and discarding frozen
embryos. For example, one clinic set a 2-year limit on
storage ‘after which unused ones [would] be destroyed
or donated for research,’ while another clinic established
a policy that ‘frozen embryos would be destroyed if
an estranged couple could not agree on ownership’
(Lipovenko, 1989). And while the Rios case raised
concerns about what should happen to frozen embryos in
the case of death, commentators also worried about what
should happen in the case of divorce, withdrawal from
treatment, disagreement within a couple, or closure of
the clinic (Baylis, 1993; Lipovenko, 1989).
That same year, the federal government established a
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies (here-
after, Royal Commission or Commission) to investigate the
‘social, ethical, health, research, legal, and economic
implications’ of reproductive technologies, and to provide
recommendations about how best to govern them (Royal
Commission, 1993, p.1175). The Commission’s final report
confirmed that only five fertility clinics offered embryo
freezing and these clinics had time limits that ‘ranged from
four months to 10 years, and one clinic’s policy was to store
them until the woman who was the source of the eggs used
to create the zygotes had turned 60’ (1993, p.537). Of note,
while the Commission reported an upper age limit of 60 at
one particular clinic, the research cited by the Commission
as the source for this data refers to an upper age limit of 40
(Stephens and McLean, 1993, p.17).
In a chapter called ‘The Handling of Eggs and Embryos’
(which included a section ‘Dealing with Spare Embryos’), the
Commission observed a need for clarity with regard to the
handling of embryos in circumstances including the death of
the embryo providers, as well as divorce and other tenuous
situations. The Commission also suggested that although‘property law may be an appropriate mechanism to achieve
the goal’ of giving gamete providers control over the
disposition of their embryos, a different conceptual frame-
work, outside the notion of property and the elements of
ownership that it suggests, would be preferable (1993,
p.597–598). To this end, the Commission recommended that
time limits and other policies related to discarding embryos
in storage be made by legislatures outside of the adversarial
process of the courts. Specifically, the Commission recom-
mended that embryos ‘not be stored for more than five years
from the date they are frozen, or beyond the death of one of
the gamete donors’ (1993, p.599).
In 1999, the two professional medical associations most
involved in the governance of assisted reproduction in
Canada – the Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists
of Canada (SOGC) and the Canadian Fertility and Andrology
Society (CFAS) – published a joint policy statement, Ethical
Issues in Assisted Reproduction. The use of reproductive
technologies in Canada had expanded substantially since the
time of the Royal Commission, and by this time it was clear
that ‘abandoned embryos’ existed in Canadian fertility
clinics, and that effective consent for embryo disposition
was necessary. While the joint policy statement was not a
clinical practice guideline, it identified ethical options for
clinicians using reproductive technologies. In the section
‘Disposition of Frozen Embryos’, the statement made clear
that ‘[v]oluntary uncoerced and informed, written consent
is integral to the ethical disposition of frozen embryos
[pregnancy, research, discard]’ (Martin et al., 1999, p.19)
and that only if gamete providers ‘waive their decisional
authority should a designated official or committee of the
freezing facility in possession of the frozen embryos …
assume decisional authority, according to mechanisms
approved in a national forum’ (p.21–22). The joint policy
statement further stipulated that when there was no
‘consent to a disposition option other than disposal, the
freezing facility should not use the embryos in any way’ and
should simply discard them (p.22). In short, the SOGC and
CFAS suggested that there should be mechanisms in place to
avoid the existence of so-called abandoned embryos through
rigorous consent practices, and, should these consent
practices fail, then fertility clinics should be empowered to
make decisions about when to discard embryos.
Embryo storage was not a major issue in the parliamen-
tary debates and public consultations leading up to the
passage of the AHR Act in 2004. However, two motions to
amend the proposed Act, raised by Liberal backbencher Paul
Szabo, are relevant insofar as they might have provided
some guidance on the use and discard of frozen embryos.
Motion no. 39 addressed embryo use, stating that ‘a donor
may not transfer to another person the ownership, or any of
the rights or obligations of ownership, of an embryo or any
other human reproductive material’ (Canada, 2003b).
Discussion about this motion, which was ultimately
defeated, centred on whether human embryos could be
considered property – something that might be traded or
exchanged between potential ‘owners.’ The other relevant
motion, Motion no. 88, examined the discarding of embryos,
suggesting that the proposed regulatory agency be explicitly
responsible for establishing limits on a range of activities
including ‘the length of time that an embryo may be stored’
(Canada, 2003a). When this motion was defeated, so too was
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establishing limits for embryo storage to Assisted Human
Reproduction Canada (the federal agency tasked with the
oversight of the AHR Act). Arguably, this task was reserved
for Parliament insofar as s.10(3) of the AHR Act (2004) on the
keeping and handling of gametes and embryos stipulated
that:
10. (3) No person shall, except in accordance with the regulations
and a licence, obtain, store, transfer, destroy, import or export (a) a
sperm or ovum, or any part of one, for the purpose of creating an
embryo; or (b) an in vitro embryo, for any purpose. (Canada, 2004)
Prior to any such regulations being developed (and any
licensing system being introduced), however, this section of
the AHR Act was found to be unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court of Canada in its 2010 decision in Reference
re Assisted Human Reproduction Act (2010 SCC 61, [2010] 3
S.C.R. 457). This section of the AHR Act was repealed in
2012, when the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act
S.C. 2012, c.19 was nominally introduced to implement
provisions announced in the 2012 federal budget, but also
introduced a number of amendments to the original AHR Act
(ss. 713–753). Section 8 was not amended, but Section 10
was repealed. New language for s.10 was proposed (s.716)
but is not in force.
While so-called abandoned embryos have long been
discussed as an issue for regulatory intervention in Canada,
they have not been a primary concern in the policy process.
Instead, policy debates on assisted reproduction in Canada
have largely focused on the potential commodification of
reproductive material and human embryos, the legitimacy of
using criminal law to govern the field, and the socio-ethical
implications of embryonic stem-cell research (Cattapan, 2015).
To date, neither legislation nor regulations have adequately
addressed so-called abandoned embryos, leaving fertility
clinics and storage facilities in the precarious position of either
discarding them in an unclear regulatory environment, or
storing them in perpetuity. TheAHR Act and related regulations
focus narrowly on the circumstances in which embryos can be
used – for reproductive purposes, for clinical training,
improving assisted reproduction procedures, or for research –
and there is no law or regulation on what to do when embryos
remain in storage, potentially in perpetuity.
To be precise, existing law and regulations are clear
about embryos for ‘own use’, and about use by others, but
not about discarding stored embryos. The AHR Act contains a
number of provisions on the use of embryos, with sections
limiting the sale of embryos and setting out the parameters
for the consent needed for their use. Section 8(3) is the most
relevant for purposes of the latter, stating that:
(3) No person shall make use of an in-vitro embryo for any purpose
unless the donor has given written consent, in accordance with the
regulations, to its use for that purpose (Canada, 2004).
The Assisted Human Reproduction (Section 8 Consent)
Regulations were brought into force in December 2007,
setting out when consent must be obtained for the use of
embryos. Most relevant here is s.13(1), which stipulates that
once an embryo has been created and ‘before a person
makes use’ of it, the person(s) for whom the embryos werecreated must have consented in writing to ‘one or more of
the following purposes,’ namely:(a) the donor’s own reproductive use,
(b) the reproductive use of a third party,
(c) improving assisted reproduction procedures,
(d) providing instruction in assisted reproduction procedures,
or
(e) a specific research project, the goal of which is stated in
the consent (Canada, 2007)
The problem with s.13(1) is that when the persons for
whom embryos were created only consent to their own
reproductive use, and do not use their embryos for this
purpose and do not provide new instructions, it is unclear
what can and should happen next. The AHR (Section 8
Consent) Regulations do not address discarding embryos,
and only provide information about certain options for own
reproductive use or for use by others.
The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement that accompa-
nied the publication of the AHR (Section 8 Consent) Regulations
in the Canada Gazette did provide some guidance, however,
suggesting ‘forthcoming regulatory proposals under section 10
[of the AHR Act] will address in vitro embryo storage limits and
destruction, which will provide further clarity’ (Canada, 2005).
As section 10 has since been repealed, however, the regulations
on consent are all that currently exist to provide guidance in
this area, and although these regulations provide clarity about
when stored embryos can be used, there is no direction at
the federal level about the eventual discarding of so-called
abandoned embryos.
In 2009, following the decision of the Quebec Court of
Appeal on the constitutional legitimacy of the AHR Act (2008
QCCA 1157, 298 D.L.R. (4th) 712), the Quebec legislature
passed the Act respecting Clinical and Research Activities
relating to Assisted Procreation, as part of an extensive
programme to both fund and regulate a wide range of
assisted reproductive services in the province. This Act
included explicit provisions about using and discarding
stored embryos. Under s.24, when embryo providers ‘fail
to make contact for more than 5 years, a centre for assisted
procreation may conserve, donate, transfer or dispose of
those persons’ gametes or embryos in a manner that is
acceptable in terms of ethics and recognized by the Minister’
(Quebec, 2009).
Although s.24 recalls the recommendations of the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies and the
ASRM guidelines in referring to a 5-year time frame prior to
discard, there was (and remains) significant concern with
the fact that at their discretion, fertility clinics and storage
facilities could use the embryos for purposes other than
those originally intended by the gamete and embryo
providers. Despite the recommendations of the Commissaire
à la santé et au bien être to alter this section of the Act,
currently there are no plans to amend this part of the
legislation (Quebec, 2014).
With the exception of Quebec, where the use and discard
of so-called abandoned embryos is at the discretion of
individual clinics, there is no governance of abandoned
embryos at the federal, provincial and territorial levels. In
cases where embryos are designated for reproductive
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dures, providing relevant instruction, or a specific research
project, directions about how to discard unused embryos
may be superfluous, or only necessary if the purposes for
which they were intended cannot be fulfilled. However,
when there is only consent for own use, and no directions for
future use or discard, or where there are such directions but
the clinics are loath to act on them without further consent,
concerns remain about how and when discarding embryos in
storage is appropriate. Ultimately, clear information about
the legal parameters for discarding so-called abandoned
embryos, potential time limits for storage, and the relevant
responsibilities of fertility clinics and storage facilities is
lacking.Recent developments in Canadian case law
The Royal Commission stated clearly that embryo disposition
decisions ‘are a matter for society, through its legislators, to
decide – not for the courts to decide through an adversarial
process’ (1993, 598). In the absence of relevant federal
legislation and regulations, however, disputes have fallen to
the courts (Rivard and Hunter, 2005, p.106). For the most
part, these cases have struggled with the legal status of the
embryo – as property, a potential person, or sui generis.
Academic literature and policy documents have tended to
suggest that the embryo is sui generis, neither property nor
potential person, but rather something that is ‘unique and
deserves greater respect than other human tissues or organs
because of its existing potential to develop into a human
being’ (Moses, 2011, p.94; Canadian Biotechnology Advisory
Committee, 2005, p.2–31). At law, however, the difficulty
of making judgements on something unique is apparent, and
judgements have used the framework of property law while
paying attention to the potentially problematic nature of
identifying human embryos as property (Dickens and Cook,
2010; Rivard and Hunter, 2005).
This understanding of embryos as property has surfaced in
two recent Canadian cases. In C.C. v A.W. (2005 ABQB 290)
the court considered who had decisional authority for
embryos created using a known sperm donor. The dispute
in this case had to do with custody of twins born to CC using
sperm from AW. AW had initially provided sperm ‘as an act of
friendship’ so that CC could become pregnant using IVF. CC
did become pregnant with the twins, and four additional
embryos were cryopreserved and stored. At the time of the
hearing, CC was seeking access to use the remaining stored
embryos, which AW refused because CC was limiting his
access to the twins. Sanderman J ultimately found that
although AW did not consent to the reproductive use of
embryos in storage, the stored embryos remained the
property of CC. Specifically, the court held that the embryos
were ‘chattels that can be used as she sees fit.’
The finding that embryos can be considered property was
affirmed in Lam v University of British Columbia (2013 BCSC
2142). In 2002, the electricity to a storage freezer at the
University of British Columbia’s Andrology Laboratory was
disrupted and many of the stored sperm samples were
damaged. In 2010, the materials in storage (including
damaged samples) were transferred to the British Columbia
Women’s Centre for Reproductive Health. Later, when theCentre was closing it petitioned the Court for permission to
discard all materials remaining in storage including the
damaged sperm samples. The Centre worried that if the
stored sperm was discarded (along with the stored embryos)
this might have a negative impact an ongoing class-action
suit by the men who had originally stored sperm with the
University of British Columbia’s Andrology Laboratory, as the
sperm would no longer be available for testing to confirm
damage should this be necessary in support of any eviden-
tiary claims (Puchta, 2015). Butler J. ruled on the petition
(as part of Lam v University of British Columbia 2015 BCCA 2)
that ‘there was no doubt that the specimens [sperm and
embryos in storage] were personal property.’ This view, that
the specimens were property, would be particularly impor-
tant to the eventual outcome of the case, as the University
of British Columbia appealed the view that the specimens
were property. This view was upheld in the judgement of
British Columbia Court of Appeal (Lam v University of British
Columbia 2015 BCCA 2). However, more important for our
purposes is that the ruling on the petition also asserted that
it is reasonable for the Centre to cease storing the
specimens, including the embryos, given that the Centre
was paying unsustainable prices for storage, ‘had taken
reasonable steps to protect the interests of the owners by
storing the specimens for a lengthy period of time without
reward,’ and had ‘taken great efforts to communicate with
the owners.’
The ruling on the petition suggests that so long as fertility
clinics or storage facilities have stored the embryos in
question for ‘a lengthy period without reward,’ that there is
a need to discard the embryos for purposes of commercial
necessity, and there have been substantial efforts to contact
those for whom the embryos were created, it is reasonable
for fertility clinics or storage facilities to discard these
embryos. Questions remain, however, as to what constitutes
‘a lengthy period,’ ‘commercial necessity’ and ‘great
efforts’. Moreover, meeting these standards for discard
may be unduly onerous. The ‘great efforts’ undertaken by
the Centre to contact those for whom the embryos were
originally created – making telephone calls, sending letters
to multiple addresses, hiring a skip tracer – were consider-
able, and some might think excessive, in a context where
the persons concerned have stopped paying storage fees.
Further, waiting until storage is spatially or financially
unsustainable, and discard is a ‘commercial necessity’ may
be excessive. Lastly, it is important to note that this decision
was reached in a particular case, at a particular moment in
time, and at a provincial (not federal) level. As such, this
ruling does not negate the need for clarity in legislation,
regulation and/or public policy.Discarding so-called abandoned embryos
On a go-forward basis, one way to reduce uncertainty
regarding stored embryos in Canada is to ensure that legally
valid written instructions for using and discarding them are
respected (i.e. acted upon). A second way to reduce
uncertainty is to introduce a legal time limit on embryo storage
after which embryos that have not been used for reproductive
purposes or transferred for use by another (such as research
use) can be discarded without having to resort to the courts.
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lines that impose a time limit on embryo storage by which
either using or discarding embryos is mandated. The
establishment of a time limit makes clear to patients,
fertility clinics and storage facilities what will be done with
embryos in storage, irrespective of their status as ‘aban-
doned’ once the time limit has lapsed. For example, some
jurisdictions allow 5 years of embryo storage (e.g. Denmark
1997); other jurisdictions have a 10-year limit (e.g. UK,
2009, New Zealand 2010 and certain parts of Australia
(Stuhmcke and Chandler, 2014)). In some jurisdictions these
limits are fixed; in other jurisdictions there is flexibility
insofar as it is possible to request and be granted extensions.
For example, in the UK, changes to the Human Fertilisation
and Embryology Act in 2009 moved the time limit from 5
years to 10 years and allowed for extensions to the 10-year
limit. In addition, amendments in 2010 to the New Zealand
Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2004 specifi-
cally allowed for the Ethics Committee to authorize longer
periods of storage (New Zealand, 2010).
The application of a time limit, not only to so-called
abandoned embryos but to all embryos created in a
particular jurisdiction, has been subject to criticism. For
example, in her research on embryo storage limits in
Australia, Anita Stuhmcke (2014, p. 289) draws attention to
the ways that 10-year time limits for embryo storage have
worked to link the ‘life’ of the embryo in storage to the
reproductive age of embryo providers. In doing so, she
argues that such time limits propagate gendered assump-
tions about a ‘universally applicable timeframe for repro-
duction,’ and calls for an understanding of embryo storage
and disposition that incorporates flexibility and accounts for
the diversity of patients’ experience. Further, as part of the
same study – which included a survey of 290 people in
Australia with embryos in storage – a minority stated that
they ‘would choose a storage time of less than 10 years,’
while ‘most preferred no time limit at all or one based on a
patient’s need or ability to use’ (Stuhmcke and Chandler,
2014, p. 132; see also Karpin et al., 2013).
To be sure, exceptions and flexibility in embryo storage
time limits are important in ensuring that patients are able
to make reproductive choices consistent with their views,
values and priorities (Karpin et al., 2013; Stuhmcke, 2014;
Stuhmcke and Chandler, 2014). At the same time, legally
mandated storage time limits are a useful mechanism to
manage the problem of so-called abandoned embryos when
patients and couples are no longer involved in reproductive
decision making. First, time limits address legal concerns
about using or discarding embryos when the persons for
whom they were created are no longer able to make
decisions for reasons of death or disability. The late
neurosurgeon and writer Paul Kalanithi’s musing on the
possibility of embryos left behind is of poignant value,
especially as he and his wife engaged in the creation of
embryos knowing that he was dying. In When Breath
Becomes Air, Kalanithi (2016, 145) imagines his own embryos
‘stuck in a freezer somewhere, too painful to destroy,
impossible to bring to full humanity: technological artefacts
that no one knew how to relate to’. Issues about the status
of stored embryos and possible inheritance are more likely
to be avoided when there is an expiration date on embryo
storage. Second, storage limits make clear to those forwhom the embryos were created that if they want to use
their embryos or control their use by others, then they need
to act before the time limit expires (either to make a
decision about use or discard, or to request an extension).
Given the well-documented difficulty that persons with
embryos in storage have in thinking about what to do with
their embryos and making decisions about using or discarding
them, storage limits can helpfully facilitate passive decision
making (Cattapan and Doyle, 2016; Lyerly et al., 2011;
Pereira et al., 2015; Provoost et al., 2012). Third, storage
limits make clear the obligations of fertility clinics and
storage facilities. While it is fair to expect that fertility
clinics will notify persons with embryos in storage when a
time limit is approaching, clinics will not have to worry
about litigation that might ensue if they discard embryos left
in storage beyond the time limit. Fourth, time limits ensure
that fertility clinics and storage facilities do not incur the
costs of storing an increasing number of embryos in
perpetuity, or of tracking persons lost to follow-up in order
to ascertain their current wishes.
Despite a complex legal and regulatory environment,
and despite concerns about federal authority to regulate
on assisted reproduction, flexible time limits for embryo
storage could be established in Canada at the federal,
provincial or territorial levels. First, at the federal level,
it is important to note that the consent regulations remain
within federal jurisdiction, and could be amended to
include provisions about discarding stored embryos.
Looking to the time limits established in the UK or New
Zealand – countries with legislation similar to that in
Canada – will prove informative in identifying both how
time limits can be used, how they might be modified to
speak particularly to the issue of so-called abandoned
embryos (thereby avoiding some of the concerns about
blanket storage limits), and the extent to which excep-
tions to, or extensions of, these limits might be appropri-
ate. At the same time, at the federal level, there is
currently little political will to engage in the governance
of reproductive technologies (Baylis et al., 2014; Snow et
al., 2015). Since 2006, when Assisted Human Reproduction
Canada was officially created, the federal government has
done little in the field of assisted human reproduction
other than scale back the AHR Act. Second, at the
provincial or territorial levels, there may be governments,
in addition to the Government of Quebec, that are willing
to establish time limits to address these concerns.
In conclusion, Canada today remains far from the
position advocated by the Royal Commission that potential
disputes about using or discarding embryos not be the
subject of litigation, and that embryos not be regarded as
property. A few disputes have ended up in court, and
the judgements have determined that embryos are a form
of property. Other approaches to using and discarding
embryos are possible, however. For example, other
jurisdictions have had success in implementing time limits
on embryo storage, which have had important effects on
addressing concerns about the fate of so-called aban-
doned embryos without making any claims about property.
The establishment of flexible time limits on embryo
storage by amending existing regulations of the AHR Act
or introducing legislation or regulations at the provincial
level could clarify what to do about these embryos.
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